Latest specification · draft-saez-xcim-04

Experimental individual Internet-Draft. A bounded C01/SR01 testnet pilot verified consent reuse and revocation on 26 October 2026; production readiness remains open.

Explicit consent protocol

XCIM records explicit consent from the person controlling a recipient email address to an identified sender for specified types of communication. An independent third party attests the consent, with immutable evidence anchored in a blockchain.

What XCIM establishes

The attestation relates a recipient address, an identified sender, explicitly accepted communication types, the consent decision and its time. Examples of communication types include promotional and transactional email. Each accepted type requires explicit consent; a transactional label does not manufacture a grant.

The issuer verifies control of the address and observes a separate consent decision. The blockchain preserves evidence of the attestation and its history. It does not replace trust in that third party's observation. Privacy-preserving commitments can anchor evidence without placing raw addresses or identity tokens on a public blockchain.

Address control: EVP, OAuth or OIDC

Revision -03 specifies EVP, OAuth with authenticated provider API verification, and OpenID Connect (OIDC) as alternative methods to establish control of the email address giving consent. An issuer may use any one admitted method after its required checks. Address verification alone does not grant permission: the same recipient must separately and explicitly accept the identified sender and communication types.

AlternativeRequired evidence
EVP (evp-01)Validated provider token and browser-key binding, with exact origin, nonce, freshness and authenticated handoff under the admitted EVP policy.
OAuth (oauth-01)Authorization code with PKCE S256 and transaction binding; an authenticated current-account provider API must supply the verified email address bound to that account. A bearer token alone is insufficient.
OIDC (oidc-01)Validated ID Token, issuer, audience, subject, nonce and freshness; email_verified must be Boolean true. Any UserInfo subject must match the ID Token subject.

Each method requires an explicitly admitted policy and binding to the same recipient's separate consent decision. Browser/provider availability and provider-specific verification remain deployment dependencies. The official Internet-Draft specifies the complete requirements.

Reusable permission and shared revocations

Revision -04 adds Shared Revocation Synchronization (SR01): retain the original permission and synchronize authenticated withdrawals, using shared evidence that the local revocation history is complete and recent. The original consent does not need renewal every five minutes. C01 remains available with its original checks; SR01 is an explicitly admitted alternative. The specification alone does not establish deployment. A separate bounded testnet pilot verified C01/SR01 on 26 October 2026; production readiness remains unproven. Read the synchronization model, compatibility and implementation limits.

Immutable history and revocable consent

An issuance record remains immutable. Withdrawal and later grants are recorded as subsequent evidence; expiry remains part of the signed grant. An authentic historical grant alone does not establish that consent is currently active. A verifier evaluates current status for the exact recipient, sender and requested communication type.

Independent of any individual message

Consent can be verified without possessing an email. XCIM does not bind consent to message content, a Message-ID, an email signature, an SMTP transaction or a delivery path. It does not classify the content of messages or attest that a message's declared type is accurate.

A destination mail server may use verified consent as a positive policy signal. It can authenticate the sender using external mechanisms, such as DKIM or DKIM2, map that authenticated identity to the consented sender and query XCIM for the recipient and communication type. That integration is optional and does not make message authentication part of the XCIM core. Consent does not guarantee delivery or inbox placement.

Substantive correction from -01

Publication and implementation status

The corrected revision is published; its official text is linked above.

This is an individual Internet-Draft with intended status Experimental. Publication does not imply IETF endorsement, working-group adoption or an approved RFC. Independent interoperability, external review and deployment evidence remain separate milestones.

Publishing and verifying blockchain evidence

Publishing on Polygon does not require running a node. An attester can submit a transaction containing a batch commitment through an RPC provider; the network's validators include it in a block. Private recipient data and the original signed grants remain off-chain.

Publication and verification are separate responsibilities. A C01 verifier must authenticate historical inclusion and finality through an independently admitted blockchain adapter. A transaction URL or agreement between untrusted RPC responses alone is insufficient. The current implementation direction uses RPC access for publication and seeks the least-infrastructure verification path that meets those requirements. No self-hosted node is required for publication, and no universal node requirement applies to ESPs.

The 26 October 2026 MuMaps/Emabled pilot verified consent and withdrawal commitments on Polygon testnet under an explicitly admitted adapter and PublicNode HTTPS trust bootstrap. It recorded CURRENT, an unchanged CURRENT recheck and REVOKED in a separate receiver. This is one operator-managed integration, not mainnet readiness or independent ESP interoperability. What the pilot demonstrates and what remains open.

C01 local reference artifacts

These preserved artifacts are the revision -02 baseline. They do not test the EVP or OAuth additions in -03.

The local suite reports 101/101 passing cases. It exercises real Ed25519 signatures using public test keys, consent queries without email input, explicit types, withdrawal and rejection cases. Its blockchain adapter is a TEST ONLY equality stub; successful consent checks still return an indeterminate public result. These tests do not establish chain finality, live third-party observation, durable storage or independent interoperability.

These development artifacts support review. The current official draft is identified above; publication of these examples does not make a test-only adapter a deployable blockchain verifier.

Historical material

P1 message-binding experiments, AS01 authority/state experiments, AN01 anchor experiments and NB01 node experiments remain available for traceability. They are not required profiles of the corrected consent core. Historical artifact hashes and current editorial status.